Abstract
This work [1] is among the first empirical papers considering attitudes towards population ethics. We commissioned two evaluations, from experts with complementary backgrounds. The first evaluator (Bruers, with expertise in welfare economics and normative ethics) rates the paper highly, while E2 (an ~experimental economist) is moderately favorable. Both see a contribution (“Highly policy relevant”, “valuable empirical insights”). Both offer some critiques and provide suggestions for robustness checks and ambitious future work. Bruers expresses “weak confidence” in the paper’s “main result” that “people do not hold the neutrality and procreation asymmetry intuitions”, loosely suggesting we should “prioritize existential risk reduction”. E2 criticizes the paper’s fundamental approach as: (1) unable to accommodate non-utilitarian beliefs/behavior, (2) implying an unrealistic “hedonic arithmetic” and (3) relying on “choices between populations” that may not reflect inherent axiological preferences. E2 also raises doubts about underpowered null results, limited characterisations of uncertainty, and the authors’ approach to aggregating participant responses into a “people believe” statement. To read these evaluations, please see the links below.
Evaluations
1. Stijn Bruers
2. Evaluator 2
Overall ratings
We asked evaluators to provide overall assessments as well as ratings for a range of specific criteria.
I. Overall assessment (See footnote)
II. Journal rank tier, normative rating (0-5): On a ‘scale of journals’, what ‘quality of journal’ should this be published in? Note: 0= lowest/none, 5= highest/best.
| Overall assessment (0-100) | Journal rank tier, normative rating (0-5) |
Stijn Bruers | 77 | 4.6 |
Evaluator 2 | 65 | 4.1 |
See “Metrics” below for a more detailed breakdown of the evaluators’ ratings across several categories. To see these ratings in the context of all Unjournal ratings, with some analysis, see our data presentation here.
See here for the current full evaluator guidelines, including further explanation of the requested ratings.
Evaluation summaries
Stijn Bruers
Highly policy relevant, original research with clear hypothesis tests and valid statistical analyses.
Biases and framing effects are mitigated but remain difficult to avoid in such surveys. Some results (e.g. the negative utilitarian judgments and a lack of asymmetry) seem to be contradictory. One possible explanation for an apparent contradictory result is not addressed.
Anonymous evaluator 2
This research provides valuable empirical insights into population ethics intuitions through well-designed experiments. The methodological progression from simple to complex scenarios demonstrate important patterns in moral reasoning. While the utilitarian framework dramatically overlooks crucial dimensions of human flourishing, reducing the validity of these studies, the data show how ordinary people resist purely arithmetic approaches to population welfare.
Metrics
Ratings
See here for details on the categories below, and the guidance given to evaluators.
| Evaluator 1 Stijn Bruers | | Evaluator 2 Anonymous | | |
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Rating category | Rating (0-100) | 90% CI (0-100)* | Rating (0-100) | 90% CI (0-100)* | Comments |
|---|
Overall assessment | 77 | (56, 94) | 65 | (60, 80) | |
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Claims, strength, characterization of evidence | 79 | (64, 93) | 60 | (50, 70) | |
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Advancing knowledge and practice | 86 | (76, 93) | 30 | (20, 50) | |
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Methods: Justification, reasonableness, validity, robustness | 71 | (55, 91) | 70 | (50, 80) | |
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Logic & communication | 82 | (73, 93) | 60 | (50, 75) | |
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Open, collaborative, replicable | 90 | (84, 95) | 90 | (80, 100) | |
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Real-world relevance/Relevance to global priorities , | 90 | (84, 96) | 40 | (30, 50) | |
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Journal ranking tiers
See here for more details on these tiers.
| Evaluator 1 Stijn Bruers | | Evaluator 2 Anonymous | | |
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Judgment | Ranking tier (0-5) | 90% CI | Ranking tier (0-5) | 90% CI | Comments |
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On a ‘scale of journals’, what ‘quality of journal’ should this be published in? | 4.6 | (4.5, 5.0) | 4.1 | (3.4, 4.4) | |
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What ‘quality journal’ do you expect this work will be published in? | 4.7 | (4.3, 5.0) | 4.0 | (4.0, 4.0) | |
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See here for more details on these tiers. | We summarize these as: 0.0: Marginally respectable/Little to no value 1.0: OK/Somewhat valuable 2.0: Marginal B-journal/Decent field journal 3.0: Top B-journal/Strong field journal 4.0: Marginal A-Journal/Top field journal 5.0: A-journal/Top journal
| |
Claim identification and assessment (summary)
For the full discussions, see the corresponding sections in each linked evaluation.
| Main research claim | Belief in claim | Suggested robustness checks | Important ‘implication’, policy, credibility |
Evaluator 1 Stijn Bruers | People do not hold the neutrality and procreation asymmetry intuitions. They believe that adding a happy person is good and [adding a happy person] is as good as adding an equally intense unhappy person is bad. | I have weak confidence in the result: I expect the neutrality and (a)symmetry views strongly depend on the context (e.g. on the choice set: the possible populations that one could choose). | A survey that measures people’s population ethical judgments in choice-set dependent contexts and under more reflection. | I consider it as (weak) evidence to prioritize existential risk reduction over suffering reduction. |
Evaluator 2 Anonymous | “Next, a one-sample t-test against the midpoint 4 revealed that participants on average judged it as an improvement to add one neutral person into the world, (M = 4.23, SD = 0.67), t(156) = 4.40, p < .001, d = 0.35. This suggests the existence of a weak general preference to create a new person, even if their happiness level is neutral.” (p. 9). | Credible Interval: [0.8, 1] | Study 2a should be globally replicated; whether a new neutral person is seen as beneficial to this world should be correlated with life conditions in each country that is studied. | N/A |
Evaluation manager’s discussion (Nicolas Treich)
This paper is among the first to empirically investigate key questions in population ethics, addressing a critical gap in a field that has been predominantly abstract and theoretical. The existing literature is grounded in utilitarian philosophy, especially following Parfit’s seminal work (1984), along with significant contributions from welfare economics, notably Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005).[2] In contrast, this paper adopts an empirical perspective, drawing on psychological methods and experimental designs to elicit laypeople’s judgments on central principles of population ethics, such as the average vs. total utilitarianism debate and the procreation asymmetry.
The paper was reviewed [evaluated] by two experts with complementary backgrounds. One reviewer, Bruers, with expertise in welfare economics and normative ethics, highlights the policy relevance of the research, characterizing it as original and rigorous, with clearly formulated hypotheses and robust statistical analysis. He supports the paper’s overall validity and offers constructive comments, particularly regarding an important framing issue. The second reviewer, an anonymous specialist in experimental economics, also acknowledges the empirical contribution of the work, especially its novel insights into population ethics derived from carefully crafted experiments. However, this reviewer is very critical of the utilitarian framework and what they describe as a "purely arithmetic" approach. While one may or may not agree with this critique, it raises important questions and stimulates valuable discussion for scholars engaged in the field of population ethics.
Why we chose this paper
See The Unjournal’s criteria (potential for impact, etc.)
ChatGPT’s response provided a good baseline:
This research investigates fundamental moral intuitions that inform decisions around population ethics, including how individuals aggregate well-being and suffering, the symmetry or asymmetry with which they value happiness and suffering, and the moral weight placed on creating new lives. These issues are directly relevant to global priorities as they underpin ethical decision-making in long-term policy and humanitarian contexts, notably affecting the allocation of resources towards future-oriented global welfare and existential risk reduction.
But the above statement is a bit vague on an actual theory of change/path to impact. Considering this further (David Reinstein’s own writing)…
Measures of lay people’s moral beliefs and intuitions about population ethics could be used to inform policy and funding decisions that aim to reflect the popular will. Empirical evidence on people’s moral belief systems could influence, and may already be influencing real-world choices, e.g., perhaps the development of ‘aligned’ AI models by powerful organizations like Anthropic.
The framing of the questions seems likely to impact the typical responses. Advocates for a particular approach to population ethics could also use this research to frame public surveys, referenda, and debates in ways that are likely to lead to outcomes they prefer. This could be used to positive or negative effect (depending on whether the people that use it are ‘right’). These insights might also help us frame these in more neutral, arguably fairer ways, or at least in multiple ways that are likely to trigger a range of intuitions. People aiming to uncover ~moral truths about population ethics through introspection and discussion may also find it useful to consider this as evidence for the ways their own intuitions may be affected by these framing.
Author engagement
The authors thanked the evaluators for their “detailed feedback and constructive suggestions”. They declined to provide a formal response.
References
[1] Caviola, L., Althaus, D., Mogensen, A. L., & Goodwin, G. P. (2022). Population ethical intuitions. Cognition, 218, 104941. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104941
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